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TYPE SPACE FUNCTORS AND INTERPRETATIONS IN
POSITIVE LOGIC
MARK KAMSMA
Abstract. We construct a 2-equivalence CohTheoryop ≃ TypeSpaceFunc. Here
CohTheory is the 2-category of positive theories and TypeSpaceFunc is the 2-
category of type space functors. We give a precise definition of interpretations
for positive logic, which will be the 1-cells in CohTheory. The 2-cells are defin-
able homomorphisms. The 2-equivalence restricts to a duality of categories,
making precise the philosophy that a theory is ‘the same’ as the collection of
its type spaces (i.e. its type space functor).
In characterising those functors that arise as type space functors, we find
that they are specific instances of (coherent) hyperdoctrines. This connects
two different schools of thought on the logical structure of a theory.
The key ingredient, the Deligne completeness theorem, arises from topos
theory, where positive theories have been studied under the name of coherent
theories.
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1. Introduction
For a first-order theory T , we can construct its Stone space Sn(T ) of n-types.
A function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} then induces an open continuous function
Sm(T ) → Sn(T ). These are standard constructions, and we can collect this data
into a functor FinSetop → Stone. In positive logic we consider only positive
existential formulas. The resulting type spaces are then spectral spaces. This is
the setting that was studied by Haykazyan in [Hay19]. There is another approach
in [BY03a, BY03b] by Ben-Yaacov, where only maximal positive existential types
are considered (equivalently, positive existential types realised in a positively closed
model). However, as Haykazyan notes, this is not a true generalisation of the first-
order setting.
The philosophy of type space functors is that they encode all information about
a certain theory. Indeed, in [Hay19, Theorem 4.4] it is shown that T and T ′ are
isomorphic (in the category that we call CohTheory, Definition 3.6) if and only if
Date: 8th May 2020.
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S(T ) and S(T ′) are naturally isomorphic. This result will actually be corollary to
our main theorem, from which it follows that S(−) is an equivalence of categories.
Positive logic has also been studied in topos theory via classifying toposes (see
section 8), where it is called coherent logic. It is in fact from this world, that we
get the key ingredient for our main proof: the Deligne completeness theorem (see
Fact 2.5). The definition of type space functors is semantical: a type is a set of
(positive existential) formulas that is realised in some model (in the classical sense,
so in Set). The characterisation we give is syntactical. The Deligne completeness
theorem provides the link between these two.
The reader that is familiar with hyperdoctrines will recognise the characterisation
of type space functors as specific (coherent) hyperdoctrines (see also Remark 5.8).
Hyperdoctrines were introduced by Lawvere [Law06] and have been studied in cat-
egorical settings (e.g. [Cou12]). Of course, type spaces have long been studied by
model theorists. This paper provides a precise proof that these two approaches are
in fact the same. While the objects in both approaches are the same, the 1-cells
and 2-cells in our 2-categories are based on model-theoretic ideas, and are different
from the categorical treatments.
Main results. We define the 2-category CohTheory of coherent theories (i.e. pos-
itive theories), interpretations and definable homomorphisms. We also define the
category CohTheory of coherent theories and strong interpretations (both in
Definition 3.6). To this end we formulate precisely what an interpretation is in
positive logic (Definition 3.1). This generalises the usual first-order definition. In
CohTheory, two theories will be equivalent precisely when they are bi-interpretable.
Isomorphisms correspond to essentially having the same Morleyisation.
We also define the 2-category TypeSpaceFunc and category TypeSpaceFunc of
type space functors (Definition 4.20). These are specific functors FinSetop → Spec,
where Spec denotes the category of spectral spaces (Definition 4.12).
The usual construction of a type space Sn(T ) from a theory T extends to a 2-
functor between the these 2-categories. This functor is part of a strict 2-equivalence,
where the inverse 2-functor assigns a theory Th(F ) to a type space functor F .
Theorem 1.1. The 2-functors
S : CohTheoryop ⇄ TypeSpaceFunc : Th
form a strict equivalence of 2-categories, which restricts to an equivalence
S : CohTheoryop ⇄ TypeSpaceFunc : Th
Corollary 1.2. The 2-equivalence in Theorem 1.1 restricts to positively model com-
plete (i.e. first-order) theories and type space functors taking their values in Stone.
There is a well-known duality DLatop ≃ Spec, where DLat is the category
of distributive lattices. So we can view type space functors FinSetop → Spec
equivalently as functors FinSet→ DLat, associating to n the Lindenbaum-Tarski
algebra of formulas in n free variables. We call such functors Lindenbaum-Tarski
functors, and collect them in a 2-category LTFunc (Definition 5.6). This exhibits
type space functors as specific instances of (coherent) hyperdoctrines (Remark 5.8).
Corollary 1.3. There is a 2-equivalence of categories
CohTheory ≃ LTFunc,
which restricts to an equivalence
CohTheory ≃ LTFunc.
This is induced by the equivalence in Theorem 1.1 and the duality DLatop ≃ Spec.
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Overview. We start with a brief recap of some preliminaries in section 2: positive
logic, spectral spaces and 2-categories. We only recall basic definitions, and refer
to more extensive treatments for the interested reader.
The aim of section 3 is to define the 2-category CohTheory and subsequently the
category CohTheory. For this we give a precise definition of an interpretation
between theories from a syntactical viewpoint.
In section 4 we first identify the characterising properties that a type space
functor of the form S(T ) always has. This gives rise to a 2-category TypeSpaceFunc
of specific functors FinSetop → Spec. We also define a categoryTypeSpaceFunc,
where the arrows are natural transformations satisfying the so-calledBeck-Chevalley
condition. We then conclude that S(−) is a functor of 2-categories.
Section 5 deals with the syntactical perspective of type space functors, and their
link to hyperdoctrines. For the main theorem, only a technical result at the start
of the section is needed (Proposition 5.3).
Section 6 describes how to construct a theory Th(F ) from a type space functor
F , as well as how to turn this operation into a 2-functor.
Section 7 contains the proof of the main theorem.
We close out with section 8, linking CohTheory to toposes via classifying toposes.
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank my supervisor, Jonathan Kirby, for
his feedback. Extending the result to the 2-categorical setting was also his idea.
This paper is part of a PhD project at the UEA (University of East Anglia), and
as such is supported by a scholarship from the UEA.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Positive logic. We only recall the basics of positive logic. There is a brief
introduction in [Hay19], and more extensive treatments in [PY18, BY03a]. We stick
to single-sorted logic. The notation and conventions for multi-sorted logic are more
complicated. However, there should be no intrinsic difficulty with generalising to
multi-sorted logic.
Positive logic has been studied in topos theory, under the name of coherent logic.
We will use that name. This section mentions both, so it can serve as a dictionary.
Definition 2.1. Fix a signature L. A coherent formula or positive existential
formula in L is one that is obtained from combining atomic formulas using ∧, ∨,
⊤, ⊥ and ∃. An h-inductive sentence is a sentence of the form ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) → ψ(x¯))
where ϕ and ψ are coherent formulas. A (coherent) theory is a set of h-inductive
sentences.
Convention 2.2. Whenever we say “formula” or “theory”, we mean “coherent for-
mula” and “coherent theory” respectively. We allow empty models. All semantics
refer to the classical semantics (i.e. in Set), unless explicitly stated otherwise.
We can encode any function symbol as its graph using a relation symbol. Having
only relation symbols simplifies things, and we lose no expressive power.
Convention 2.3. Every signature we consider is purely relational.
Any first-order theory can be presented as a coherent theory. This is done
through a process called Morleyisation, see just after Fact 2.7 in [Hay19]. We recall
the following definition from there as well, giving a name to the coherent theories
that are essentially first-order theories.
Definition 2.4. A coherent theory T is called positively model complete if for every
formula ϕ(x) there is a formula ψ(x) such that T |= ∀x¯(¬ϕ(x¯)↔ ψ(x¯)).
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Recall that T |= ϕ means that ϕ is true in every model of T . By soundness and
completeness this coincides with ϕ being derivable from T using classical logic. For
coherent logic, we can restrict the deduction-system to the one in Definition 6.10.
The following appears as [MM94, Corollary IX.11.3].
Fact 2.5 (Deligne completeness theorem). Let T be a coherent theory. An h-
inductive sentence ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)) can be deduced from T in the deduction-system
for coherent logic if and only if T |= ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)).
2.2. Spectral spaces. For an extensive treatment of spectral spaces, see [DST19].
Definition 2.6. For a topological space X , write Ko(X) for the partial order of
compact open subsets. As such, we consider Ko(X) as a category.
Definition 2.7. A topological space X is called spectral if it is compact, T0, sober
and such that Ko(X) is closed under finite intersections and forms a basis of the
topology. A continuous function f : X → Y of spectral spaces is called a spectral
map if the preimage of a compact open set is compact open. We define Spec to be
the category of spectral spaces and spectral maps.
Fact 2.8 ([DST19, Theorem 1.3.4]). A spectral space is Hausdorff if and only if it
is a Stone space.
We write DLat for the category of distributive lattices with distributive lattice
homomorphisms. There is a duality DLatop ≃ Spec, see for example [Joh92, Sec-
tion II.3] or [DST19, Section 3.2], called the Stone duality for distributive lattices.
Let L be a distributive lattice, then the space associated to it is Spec(L), the
spectrum of L. Its points are prime filters on L, and the sets
{F ∈ Spec(L) : a ∈ F},
where a ∈ L, form a basis of compact open sets. A homomorphism f : L → L′
of distributive lattices, induces a spectral map Spec(L′) → Spec(L) by sending a
prime filter F ′ on L′ to f−1(F ′).
Conversely, given a spectral space X , the corresponding distributive lattice is
given by Ko(X) and a spectral map f : X → X ′ induces a homomorphism of
distributive lattices f−1 : Ko(X ′)→ Ko(X).
2.3. 2-categories. For an extensive treatment of 2-categories see [Joh02a, Section
B1.1] or [JY20]. In this paper we will only be interested in strict 2-categories and
strict 2-functors.
Convention 2.9. We use the font Category for (strict) 2-categories, and Category
for (normal) categories. We denote by Categoryop the 2-category where all 1-cells
are reversed, but the direction of the 2-cells does not change.
In addition to objects (0-cells) and arrows (1-cells), a 2-category also has 2-cells,
which are morphisms between 1-cells. This allows for the notion of equivalence in a
2-category: two objects A and B are equivalent if there are 1-cells f : A→ B and
g : B → A such that their compositions are isomorphic, via 2-cells, to the identity.
So for example, bi-interpretability of theories is the same thing as being equivalent
in the appropriate 2-category, see Remark 3.7.
Throughout the paper we have simplified results to normal categories as well.
This should help if the reader is less familiar with 2-categories.
3. Category of theories and interpretations
Definition 3.1. Let T and T ′ be theories in signatures L and L′ respectively. An
interpretation (Γ, k) : T → T ′, where k ≥ 1, assigns to each n-ary relation symbol
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R in T (including the binary symbol for equality) an nk-ary L′-formula Γ(R). This
can be extended uniquely to a function sending L-formulas to L′-formulas. We then
also require for all L-formulas ϕ(x¯) and ψ(x¯) that precisely have free variables x¯
(i.e. they all appear in the formulas):
T |= ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)) =⇒ T ′ |= ∀x¯1 . . . x¯n(Γ(ϕ)(x¯1, . . . , x¯n)→ Γ(ψ)(x¯1, . . . , x¯n)).
An interpretation (Γ, 1) : T → T ′ that interprets equality as equality is called a
strong interpretation, and we simplify the notation to Γ : T → T ′.
What we call strong interpretation is just called “interpretation” in [Hay19,
Definition 4.3]. The same name is also used in topos theory for something in
between our notions of strong interpretation and interpretation, see Remark 8.2.
However, the model-theoretic notion of interpretation for first-order logic already
exists and does in fact coincide with our definition for positively model complete
theories, see e.g. [Hod93, Chapter 5].
Remark 3.2. Let (Γ, k) : T → T ′ be an interpretation and let M |= T ′. Then we
can define a model Γ∗(M) as follows. The formula Γ(x = y) defines an equivalence
relation on A = {a¯ ∈ Mk : Γ(x = x)(a¯)}. As underlying set for Γ∗(M) we take
A/Γ(x = y). An n-ary relation symbol R is then interpreted as
{([a¯1], . . . , [a¯n]) ∈ Γ
∗(M)n :M |= Γ(R)(a¯1, . . . , a¯n)},
where [a¯] denotes the equivalence class of a¯. The fact that (Γ, k) is an interpretation
makes this well-defined. By induction we see that Γ∗(M) |= ϕ([a¯1], . . . , [a¯n]) if and
only if M |= Γ(ϕ)(a¯1, . . . , a¯n). So in particular, Γ∗(M) is a model of T .
For a strong interpretation Γ : T → T ′, the underlying set of Γ∗(M) is the same
as for M itself.
Remark 3.3. With the notation of Definition 3.1: given any L-formula ϕ(x¯), where
not all x¯ appear, we can easily make them appear by considering the equivalent
formula ϕ(x¯) ∧ x¯ = x¯ (where x¯ = x¯ is short for a conjunction of equalities). The
point of course is that Γ(ϕ) and Γ(ϕ ∧ x¯ = x¯) may not be equivalent, because
Γ(x = x) may not be the entire domain.
Definition 3.4. Let (Γ, k), (Γ′, k′) : T → T ′ be interpretations. A morphism of
interpretations θ : (Γ, k) → (Γ′, k′) is a formula θ(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk′) in the
language of T ′ such that:
(1) T ′ |= ∀x¯(Γ(x = x)(x¯)→ ∃y¯θ(x¯, y¯)),
(2) T ′ |= ∀x¯y¯(θ(x¯, y¯)→ Γ(x = x)(x¯) ∧ Γ′(y = y)(y¯)),
(3) T ′ |= ∀x¯x¯′y¯(θ(x¯, y¯) ∧ Γ(x = x′)(x¯, x¯′)→ θ(x¯′, y¯)),
(4) T ′ |= ∀x¯y¯y¯′(θ(x¯, y¯) ∧ Γ′(y = y′)(y¯, y¯′)→ θ(x¯, y¯′)),
(5) for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) in the language of T , we have:
T ′ |= ∀x¯1 . . . x¯ny¯1 . . . y¯n(Γ(ϕ)(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) ∧
n∧
i=1
θ(x¯i, y¯i)→ Γ
′(ϕ)(y¯1, . . . , y¯n)).
This simplifies to T ′ |= Γ(ϕ)→ Γ′(ϕ) for formulas without free variables.
Two morphisms of interpretations are considered to be equal if they are equivalent
formulas, modulo the relevant theory.
Given morphisms θ(x¯, y¯) : (Γ, k) → (Γ′, k′) and η(y¯, z¯) : (Γ′, k′) → (Γ′′, k′′), we
define their composition to be ∃y¯(θ(x¯, y¯) ∧ η(y¯, z¯)). One easily checks that this
defines a morphism (Γ, k)→ (Γ′′, k′′).
Remark 3.5. Let M be a model of T ′ and use the notation from Definition 3.4.
Then θ defines a homomorphism fθ : Γ
∗(M) → Γ′∗(M). For an equivalence class
[a¯] ∈ Γ∗(M) we let [b¯] ∈ Γ′∗(M) be such that M |= θ(a¯, b¯), and we set fθ([a¯]) = [b¯].
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Definition 3.6. The 2-category of theories CohTheory has as objects theories,
as 1-cells interpretations and as 2-cells morphisms of interpretations. Horizontal
composition is defined as follows. Consider the following diagram
T ⇓ θ T ′ ⇓ η T ′′
(Γ,k)
(Γ′,k′)
(∆,ℓ)
(∆′,ℓ′)
Then η ∗ θ is the following formula:
∃y¯1 . . . y¯k′

∆(θ)(x¯1, . . . , x¯k, y¯1, . . . , y¯k′) ∧
k′∧
i=1
η(y¯i, z¯i)

 ,
where each x¯i and y¯i is of length ℓ and each z¯i is of length ℓ
′.
The category of theories CohTheory has as objects theories and as arrows
strong interpretations.
Checking that CohTheory satisfies the axioms of a strict 2-category is lengthy,
but straightforward and we omit the proof.
Remark 3.7. An equivalence of two theories T and T ′ in CohTheory consists of
interpretations (Γ, k) : T → T ′ and (Γ′, k′) : T ′ → T such that both compositions
are isomorphic, via 2-cells, to the relevant identity interpretations. Such 2-cells cor-
respond to definable isomorphisms (see Remark 3.5). So equivalences in CohTheory
are precisely bi-interpretations.
4. Category of type space functors
We start this section by recalling some definitions and facts. From Definition 4.12
on we make and treat new definitions.
Definition 4.1. Let T be a theory, let M be a model of T and let a¯ ∈ M be a
tuple of elements. The (coherent) type of a¯ is defined as:
ctpM (a¯) = {ϕ(x¯) :M |= ϕ(a¯)}.
A (complete) type in free variables x¯ is a set of formulas p(x¯) such that p(x¯) =
ctpM (a¯) for some model M of T and some a¯ ∈M .
The category of all natural numbers together with all maps between them is a
skeleton of the category of finite sets FinSet, so we can identify those categories.
Definition 4.2. We define the type space functor S(T ) : FinSetop → Spec of a
theory T as follows.
Let n ≥ 0 be a natural number. Then we define Sn(T ) to be the set of all complete
types in n free variables. For a formula ϕ we write [ϕ] = {p ∈ Sn(T ) : ϕ ∈ p}, and
we topologise Sn(T ) by taking these sets as basic opens. We call Sn(T ) the type
space of T in n free variables.
For a natural number n, we write n = {1, . . . , n}. For a function f : n→ m, we
define a function Sf (T ) : Sm(T )→ Sn(T ) as follows:
Sf (T )(p) = {ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) : ϕ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n)) ∈ p(x1, . . . , xm)}.
Semantically, for a realisation a¯ ∈M of p, we get Sf (T )(p) = ctpM (af(1), . . . , af(n)).
The notation for nmay be non-standard, as usually one would take {0, . . . , n−1}.
However, the elements in n are indices of variables so we prefer to start at 1.
Fact 4.3. Let T be a theory, then:
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(i) U ⊆ Sn(T ) is compact and open iff U = [ϕ] for some formula ϕ,
(ii) T is positively model complete iff Sn(T ) is a Stone space for all n ≥ 0,
(iii) for any f : n→ n, the map Sf (T ) is spectral and open.
Proof. Fact (i) follows from compactness and is [Hay19, Lemma 3.4]. For (ii): note
that T is positively model complete if and only if Sn(T ) is Hausdorff for all n ≥ 0,
by [Hay19, Proposition 3.8]. Which is equivalent to Sn(T ) being a Stone space for
all n ≥ 0, by Fact 2.8. Finally, (iii) is precisely [Hay19, Proposition 4.1]. 
Remark 4.4. In the proof of [Hay19, Proposition 4.1] an explicit description is
given of the images and preimages of compact open sets. These explicit descriptions
are useful, so we repeat them here:
Sf (T )([ϕ(x1, . . . , xm)]) = [∃y1 . . . ym(ϕ(y1, . . . , ym)∧x1 = yf(1)∧ . . .∧xn = yf(n))],
and
Sf (T )
−1([ψ(x1, . . . , xn)]) = [ψ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))].
Taking the direct image corresponds to introducing existential quantifiers and
identifying variables. Taking the preimage corresponds to substitution of variables.
Remark 4.5. For every f : n → m, we have a functor Sf (T )−1 : Ko(Sn(T )) →
Ko(Sm(T )), because Sf (T ) is a spectral map. We also have a functor Sf (T ) :
Ko(Sm(T )) → Ko(Sn(T )) by taking direct images, because Sf (T ) is an open con-
tinuous map. This gives rise to an adjoint pair of functors Sf (T ) ⊣ Sf (T )−1.
For a logical formula, it does not matter if we first quantify and identify variables,
and then substitute or the other way around. This can be expressed in terms of
the adjunction Sf (T ) ⊣ Sf (T )
−1 by what is called the Beck-Chevalley condition
(see e.g. [MM94, Section IV.9]). We will not recall the full definition, but only a
simplified version for partial orders.
Definition 4.6. Let A,B, C and D be partial orders considered as categories. Sup-
pose we have a commuting square of functors as on the left, and that G∗ and H∗
have left adjoints G∗ and H∗ respectively. Then we can also form the square on
the right.
A B A B
C D C D
F
G∗ H∗  
F
K K
G∗ H∗
We say that the first square satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition if the second
square commutes.
In the setting of the above definition we always have
H∗K ≤ H∗KG∗G
∗ = H∗H∗FG
∗ ≤ FG∗,
where the first inequality is H∗K applied to the unit of G∗ ⊣ G∗, the middle
equality is the commutativity of the first square and the final inequality is due to
the counit of H∗ ⊣ H∗.
Fact 4.7. In the setting of Definition 4.6, we always have H∗K ≤ FG∗. So
satisfying the Beck-Chevalley condition is equivalent to having FG∗ ≤ H∗K.
Example 4.8. Let f : n → n+ 1 be the inclusion, and let g : n → m be any
function. Let f ′ : m→ m+ 1 and g′ : n+ 1→ m+ 1 be the pushout of f and g.
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That is, f ′ is the inclusion and g′ is the extension of g such that g(n+1) = m+1.
Then this induces a commutative square
Ko(Sn(T )) Ko(Sm(T ))
Ko(Sn+1(T )) Ko(Sm+1(T ))
Sg(T )
−1
Sf (T )
−1 Sf′ (T )
−1
Sg′ (T )
−1
This square satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition, which is equivalent to
[∃xn+1ϕ(xg(1), . . . , xg(n), xn+1)] = [∃xm+1ϕ(xg′(1), . . . , xg′(n), xg′(n+1))],
for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn+1). Indeed, this last equality holds because the right
side is just
[∃xm+1ϕ(xg(1), . . . , xg(n), xm+1)]
and m+ 1 is not in the range of g.
Example 4.9. Let f : n+ 1 → n be the identity on n and f(n + 1) = n. Let
g : n+ 1→m be any function. Denote by f ′ :m→ k and g′ : n→ k the pushout
of f and g. Again, this pushout induces a commutative square like in Example 4.8,
and again this square satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition. In this case that comes
down to checking the equality
[ϕ(xg(1), . . . , xg(n)) ∧ xg(n) = xg(n+1)] =
[∃y1 . . . yk(ϕ(yg′(1), . . . , yg′(n)) ∧ x1 = yf ′(1) ∧ . . . ∧ xm = yf ′(m))],
for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn).
By Fact 4.7 we only have to check that the first formula implies the second.
So we let x1, . . . , xm be such that ϕ(xg(1), . . . , xg(n)) and xg(n) = xg(n+1). Define
α : n → {x1, . . . , xm} by α(i) = xg(i), and let β : m → {x1, . . . , xm} be given by
β(i) = xi. Then since xg(n) = xg(n+1) we have that αf = βg, so by the universal
property of the pushout there is γ : k → {x1, . . . , xm}. We take yi = γ(i) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k, then one easily verifies that ϕ(yg′(1), . . . , yg′(n))∧x1 = yf ′(1)∧ . . .∧xm =
yf ′(m) holds, as required.
Proposition 4.10. Any pushout square in FinSet induces a commutative square,
like in Example 4.8, which satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition.
Proof. In Example 4.8 and Example 4.9 we have verified this claim for specific
functions f . Up to isomorphism, every function in FinSet decomposes as such
functions. So by composing squares we conclude that the claim indeed holds for
any pushout square. 
We can now characterise those functors that arise as type space functors.
Convention 4.11. Let F : FinSetop → Spec be a functor, we denote by Fn and
Ff the images of n and f : n → m respectively, to match the notation of S(T ).
Furthermore, we use f×k : nk→mk to denote the map that is f on each of the k
copies of n. More precisely, viewing nk as n × k (and similarly for mk), we have
f×k(x, y) = (f(x), y).
Definition 4.12. A functor F : FinSetop → Spec is called open if every map in
its image is open. Such an open functor is called a type space functor if for every
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pushout in FinSet, the induced square satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition.
a b Ko(Fa) K
o(Fb)
c d Ko(Fc) Ko(Fd)
f
g pushout h ⇒
F
−1
f
F−1g satisfies B.C. F−1h
k F
−1
k
Definition 4.13. Let F be a type space functor. For k ≥ 1, a cartesian family
(of arity k) is a family Θn ⊆ Fnk of compact open sets, indexed by the natural
numbers, such that the following holds. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n denote by ji,n : 1 →֒ n the
map with value i. For all n, we require:
Θn =
n⋂
i=1
F−1
j
×k
i,n
(Θ1).
For n = 0 this is the empty intersection, that is Θ0 = F0.
The name cartesian family is based on the idea that compact open sets corres-
pond to definable sets (Fact 4.3(i)). Then Θn corresponds to the cartesian product
of n times Θ1. The entire cartesian family can clearly be recovered from Θ1.
Lemma 4.14. Let Θn be a cartesian family of arity k for F and let f : n→m be
any function. Then Θm ⊆ F
−1
f×k
(Θn) and if f is surjective we have equality.
Proof. We have
F−1
f×k
(Θn) = F
−1
f×k
(
n⋂
i=1
F−1
j×k
i,n
(Θ1)) =
n⋂
i=1
F−1
f×k
F−1
j×k
i,n
(Θ1) =
n⋂
i=1
F−1
j×k
f×k(i),m
(Θ1).
The result follows because Θm =
⋂m
i=1 F
−1
j
×k
i,m
(Θ1), with the final remark because
f×k is surjective precisely when f is. 
Definition 4.15. Let F, F ′ be type space functors. A partial natural transforma-
tion (of arity k) is a pair (β, k) : F 99K F ′ where k ≥ 1 and β is a family of partial
spectral maps βn : Fnk 99K F
′
n. Here n ranges over the natural numbers. The
domains of β are required to form a cartesian family (of arity k). Furthermore, for
each f : n→m we require the following to commute:
Fmk F
′
m
Fnk F
′
n
βm
F
f×k F
′
f
βn
This last requirement is well-defined, because Lemma 4.14 implies that we always
have Ff×k(dom(βm)) ⊆ dom(βn).
The partial natural transformations will correspond to interpretations, so we
need to express that they preserve necessary logical properties. This is done by
a weak version of the Beck-Chevalley condition. Example 4.22 illustrates why we
have to consider this weaker version.
Definition 4.16. A partial natural transformation (β, k) : F → F ′ is said to satisfy
the weak Beck-Chevalley condition if for any f : n→m the following commutes:
Ko(F ′n) K
o(Fnk)
Ko(F ′m) K
o(Fmk)
β−1n ∩Ff×k (Fmk)
F ′f
β−1m
F
f×k
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We say that (β, k) satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition if the above diagram com-
mutes already without taking the intersection. That is β−1n F
′
f = Ff×kβ
−1
m .
We postpone the definition of a morphism of partial natural transformations
Θ : (β, k) → (β′, k′) to Definition 6.6, where we will have developed the necessary
notation. Right now, it is sufficient to know that it consists of a cartesian family
Θn ⊆ Fnk+nk′ satisfying some additional conditions that essentially code (1)–(5)
from Definition 3.4.
Definition 4.17. For an interpretation (Γ, k) : T → T ′, we define the partial nat-
ural transformation S(Γ, k) : S(T ′) 99K S(T ) of arity k, where S(Γ, k)n : Snk(T
′) 99K
Sn(T ) has domain [Γ(x¯ = x¯)] and is given by
S(Γ, k)n(p) = {ϕ(x¯) : Γ(ϕ(x¯) ∧ x¯ = x¯) ∈ p}.
For a morphism of interpretations θ : (Γ, k) → (Γ′, k′) we define the morphism of
partial natural transformations S(θ) : S(Γ, k)→ S(Γ′, k′) by
S(θ)n = [θ(x¯1, y¯1) ∧ . . . ∧ θ(x¯n, y¯n)] ⊆ Sn(k+k′)(T
′).
Remark 4.18. Using Remark 3.2, we can also define S(Γ, k) semantically as fol-
lows. For p ∈ [Γ(x¯ = x¯)] ⊆ Snk(T ′), let a¯1, . . . , a¯n be a realisation of p in some
M |= T ′, then S(θ)n(p) = ctp
Γ∗(M)([a¯1], . . . , [a¯n]).
Lemma 4.19. With the notation as in Definition 4.17, we have:
(i) S(Γ, k)−1n ([ϕ(x¯)]) = [Γ(ϕ(x¯) ∧ x¯ = x¯)],
(ii) S(Γ, k) satisfies the weak Beck-Chevalley condition.
For a strong interpretation Γ : T → T ′ this simplifies to:
(i’) S(Γ)−1n ([ϕ]) = [Γ(ϕ)],
(ii’) S(Γ) satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition.
Proof. This comes down to writing out definitions, where (i) is useful for (ii). 
Definition 4.20. The 2-category of type space functors TypeSpaceFunc has as
objects type space functors, as 1-cells partial natural transformations that satisfy
weak Beck-Chevalley and as 2-cells morphisms of partial natural transformations.
The category of type space functors TypeSpaceFunc has as objects type space
functors and as arrows natural transformations that satisfy Beck-Chevalley.
Corollary 4.21. The operations defined in Definition 4.2 and Definition 4.17 define
a 2-functor S : CohTheoryop → TypeSpaceFunc, which restricts to a functor S :
CohTheoryop → TypeSpaceFunc.
Proof. Let T be a theory, by Fact 4.3 and Proposition 4.10, S(T ) is actually an
object in TypeSpaceFunc and in TypeSpaceFunc.
For an interpretation (Γ, k) : T → T ′, Lemma 4.19 implies that S(Γ, k) is indeed
a partial natural transformation. Using the same lemma, a strong interpretation
will indeed correspond to an arrow in CohTheory.
As noted before, the requirements on a morphism of partial natural transform-
ations just code those on a morphism of partial natural transformations. So the
2-functor is also well-defined on 2-cells. 
Example 4.22. This example illustrates why for general interpretations we have
to consider the weak Beck-Chevalley condition. Let T be the empty theory in
the empty language. Let T ′ be the theory with one binary relation symbol E,
expressing that E is an equivalence relation (possibly not defined everywhere). We
define (Γ, 1) : T → T ′ by setting Γ(x = y) to be E(x, y). Let f : 2 → 1, then
writing out definitions we have
S(Γ, 1)−12 (Sf (T )([x = x])) = S(Γ, 1)
−1
2 ([x = y]) = [E(x, y)],
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and
Sf (T
′)(S(Γ, 1)−11 ([x = x])) = Sf (T
′)([E(x, x)]) = [x = y ∧ E(x, x) ∧ E(y, y)].
Clearly these two are not the same. The first one is missing a conjunction with
“x = y”, which would precisely correspond to intersecting with the image of Sf (T
′).
5. Hyperdoctrines and the Frobenius condition
In this section we connect type space functors with (coherent) hyperdoctrines.
For this we recall one more property, the Frobenius condition and we show that type
space functors satisfy this condition (Definition 5.1 and Proposition 5.3). Besides
that the contents of this section are not needed for the main theorem.
We always have that ψ(x1)∧∃x2ϕ(x1, x2) is equivalent to ∃x2(ψ(x1)∧ϕ(x1, x2)).
If we let f : 1→ 2, then this can be expressed as
Sf (T )([ϕ] ∩ Sf (T )
−1([ψ])) = Sf (T )([ϕ]) ∩ [ψ].
This property makes sense for arbitrary adjoints between categories with products,
and is called the Frobenius condition (see e.g. [MM94, Section IV.9]). We will
once more just be interested in the simpler case where the categories involved are
distributive lattices.
Definition 5.1. Let A and B be distributive lattices, viewed as categories. Let
F : A⇄ B : G be functors, with F ⊣ G. Then this pair of adjoints is said to satisfy
the Frobenius condition if for all A and B we have:
F (A ∧G(B)) = F (A) ∧B.
The unit of the adjunction in Definition 5.1 gives us that A ≤ GF (A), and so we
have A ∧ G(B) ≤ GF (A) ∧ G(B). Because right adjoints preserve limits, we have
GF (A) ∧G(B) = G(F (A) ∧B), and thus
A ∧G(B) ≤ G(F (A) ∧B).
Then applying the adjunction, we arrive at the following fact.
Fact 5.2. For any pair of adjoint functors as in Definition 5.1, we always have
F (A ∧G(B)) ≤ F (A) ∧B.
For every f : n → m in FinSet the adjoints Sf (T ) ⊣ S
−1
f (T ) satisfy the
Frobenius condition. This can be checked directly, but it also follows from the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.3. Let f : X → Y be an open spectral map of spectral spaces, then
the corresponding homomorphism of distributive lattices f−1 : Ko(Y )→ Ko(X) has
a left adjoint and satisfies the Frobenius condition.
Proof. As before, taking the direct image is left adjoint to taking the preimage.
By Fact 5.2 it is then enough to check f(U)∩V ⊆ f(U ∩f−1(V )) for all U ∈ Ko(X)
and V ∈ Ko(Y ), which is easily done. 
Using the duality between Spec andDLat we may also view type space functors
as functors FinSet→ DLat, giving a more syntactic perspective. To characterise
these functors from this perspective, we prove the converse of Proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.4. Let f : A→ B be a homomorphism of distributive lattices with
a left adjoint h : B → A satisfying the Frobenius condition. Then the corresponding
spectral map f−1 : Spec(B)→ Spec(A) is open.
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Proof. Let U be a basic open in Spec(B), so U = {F ∈ Spec(B) : b ∈ F} for
some b ∈ B. We claim that U ′ = {f−1(F ) : F ∈ U} is the basic open V = {G ∈
Spec(A) : h(b) ∈ G}, which would prove the proposition.
First, we prove U ′ ⊆ V . We claim that for a prime filter F ⊆ B, we have that
f−1(F ) =↑ h(F ) := {a ∈ A : h(b′) ≤ a for some b′ ∈ F}.
For a ∈ f−1(F ) we have that f(a) ∈ F , so the unit of the adjunction gives hf(a) ≤ a
and thus a ∈ ↑ h(F ). For the other inclusion, let a ∈ ↑ h(F ) and b′ ∈ F such that
h(b′) ≤ a. The adjunction gives b′ ≤ f(a), and thus f(a) ∈ F , so a ∈ f−1(F ).
Let F ∈ U , then b ∈ F , so h(b) ∈ ↑ h(F ) = f−1(F ) using the claim. We thus
conclude that indeed f−1(F ) ∈ V .
It remains to prove that V ⊆ U ′. So let G be a prime filter containing h(b). Then
for any a ∈ G we have f(a) ∧ b 6= 0. Because if f(a) ∧ b = 0, then by Frobenius we
would have 0 = h(f(a) ∧ b) = a ∧ h(b) ∈ G. So if we close f(G) ∪ {b} under finite
meets and then take the upward closure, we get a filter F ′.
Consider
I = {b′ ∈ B : b′ ≤ f(a) for some a 6∈ G},
then I is an ideal. Indeed, it is clearly non-empty and downwards closed. For
b1 ≤ f(a1) and b2 ≤ f(a2) with a1, a2 6∈ G, we have a1 ∨ a2 6∈ G since G is a prime
filter, and indeed b1 ∨ b2 ≤ f(a1) ∨ f(a2) = f(a1 ∨ a2).
We claim that I ∩F ′ = ∅. Any b′ ∈ I ∩F ′ would satisfy f(a)∧ b ≤ b′ ≤ f(a′) for
some a ∈ G and a′ 6∈ G. So applying the adjunction and Frobenius we would have
a ∧ h(b) = h(f(a) ∧ b) ≤ a′, which implies a′ ∈ G and so we have a contradiction.
Using Zorn’s lemma, we can then extend F ′ to a filter F that is maximal disjoint
from I. In particular, such an F is a prime filter containing b. We finish our proof
by showing that f−1(F ) = G. We directly have G ⊆ f−1(f(G)) ⊆ f−1(F ). For the
other inclusion we let a ∈ f−1(F ), then f(a) ∈ F and thus f(a) 6∈ I. So we must
have a ∈ G, as required, because otherwise we would have f(a) ∈ I. 
Corollary 5.5. A spectral map of spectral spaces is open if and only if the cor-
responding homomorphism of distributive lattices has a left adjoint satisfying the
Frobenius condition.
If we take the perspective of S(T ) being a functor into DLat, then we get
a functor that associates to each n the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of coherent
formulas in n free variables.
Definition 5.6. We call a functor F : FinSet → DLat a Lindenbaum-Tarski
functor if every homomorphism in the image of F has a left adjoint satisfying the
Frobenius condition, and if the image under F of every pushout in FinSet satisfies
the Beck-Chevalley condition.
Definition 4.15 and Definition 6.6 can easily be restated in terms of Lindenbaum-
Tarski functors, so we view them as definitions for this setting as well. Note that
a partial spectral map f : X 99K Y (with compact open domain) corresponds to
a lattice homomorphism f−1 : Ko(Y ) → Ko(X) that may not preserve the top
element.
The 2-category of Lindenbaum-Tarski functors LTFunc has Lindenbaum-Tarski
functors as objects, as 1-cells partial natural transformations that satisfy weak
Beck-Chevalley and as 2-cells morphisms of partial natural transformations.
The category of Lindenbaum-Tarksi functors LTFunc has Lindenbaum-Tarksi
functors as objects and the arrows are natural transformations that satisfy the
Beck-Chevalley condition.
Corollary 5.7. The duality DLatop ≃ Spec induces a 2-equivalence LTFuncop ≃
TypeSpaceFunc that restricts to a duality LTFuncop ≃ TypeSpaceFunc.
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Remark 5.8. What we call a Lindenbaum-Tarski functor is a special case of the
more general concept of a (coherent) hyperdoctrine (see [Law06] and [Cou12]).
Hyperdoctrines are more general in the sense that they admit any Cop as domain
where C is finitely complete. Besides that the 1-cells and 2-cells in our setting are
different from those in [Cou12].
6. Recovering a theory
The goal of this section is to construct a 2-functor Th(−) that will recover a
theory from a type space functor. This 2-functor will turn out to be the inverse of
S(−). In particular, Th(S(T )) will essentially be the Morleyisation of T .
The key ingredient in linking the theory we build to semantics is the Deligne
completeness theorem (Fact 2.5). For this we need to introduce a deduction-system,
which we formulate as a sequent calculus.
Definition 6.1. A (coherent) sequent is an assertion of the form
ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ,
where ϕ and ψ are coherent formulas and x¯ is a finite tuple of variables, such that
the free variables in ϕ and ψ are in x¯.
A sequent ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ corresponds to the h-inductive sentence ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)). So
a theory is the same thing as a set of sequents.
Definition 6.2. Let F be a type space functor, we define the internal logic of F as
follows. The signature L(F ) has an n-ary relation symbol RU for every U ∈ Ko(Fn),
for all n ≥ 0.
An n-ary L(F )-formula ϕ will be interpreted as some compact open JϕK ⊆ Fn,
defined by induction on the complexity of the formula:
• J⊤K = F0 and J⊥K = ∅ (⊥ is considered as an n-ary formula for all n);
• JRU (xf(1), . . . , xf(n))K = F−1f (U), for all f : n→m and U ∈ Ko(Fn);
• Jxi = xjK = Fe(Fn), where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and e : n → n sends i to j and is
the identity everywhere else;
• Jϕ ∧ ψK = JϕK ∩ JψK;
• Jϕ ∨ ψK = JϕK ∪ JψK;
• J∃xn+1ϕ(x¯, xn+1)K = Ff (Jϕ(x¯, xn+1)K), where f : n → n+ 1 is the inclu-
sion.
Finally, we define the theory of F as follows:
Th(F ) = {ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ : JϕK ⊆ JψK}.
Remark 6.3. Because the compact open subsets of Sn(T ) correspond to formulas
in the language of T , every RU ∈ L(S(T )) is of the form R[ϕ(x¯)] for some ϕ(x¯). We
may assume that all variables in x¯ actually appear in ϕ(x¯).
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4. Let F be a type space functor, then for L(F )-formulas ϕ and ψ:
Th(F ) |= ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)) if and only if JϕK ⊆ JψK.
Corollary 6.5. Let F be a type space functor, and let ϕ be an L(F )-formula. Then
ϕ is equivalent to RJϕK, modulo Th(F ).
Proof. Straightforward induction on the complexity of ϕ, using Theorem 6.4. 
We postponed the definition of the 2-cells in TypeSpaceFunc to this point, be-
cause they are easier and more intuitive to state in terms of the internal logic.
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Definition 6.6. Let (β, k), (β′, k′) : F 99K F ′ be partial natural transformations.
A morphism of partial natural transformations Θ : (β, k) → (β′, k′) is a cartesian
family Θn ⊆ Fnk+nk′ , such that for every compact open U ⊆ F ′n we have
JRΘn(x¯, y¯) ∧Rβ−1n (U)(x¯)K ⊆ JRβ′−1n (U)(y¯)K.
Furthermore, we require for all n that the following also hold:
JRΘn(x¯, y¯) ∧Rβ−12 (Jx=x′K)(x¯, x¯′)K ⊆ JRΘn(x¯′, y¯)K,JRΘn(x¯, y¯) ∧Rβ′−12 (Jy=y′K)(y¯, y¯′)K ⊆ JRΘn(x¯, y¯′)K,J∃y¯RΘn(x¯, y¯)K = dom(βn).
We define vertical composition by:
(ΩΘ)n = J∃y¯(RΘn(x¯, y¯) ∧RΩn(y¯, z¯))K.
For horizontal composition, consider the following diagram:
F Ω ⇓ F ′ Θ ⇓ F ′′
(γ,ℓ)
(γ′,ℓ′)
(β,k)
(β′,k′)
Then for all n:
(Θ ∗Ω)n =
u
v∃y¯1 . . . y¯k′

Rγ−1
n(k+k′)
(Θn)
(x¯1, . . . , x¯k, y¯1, . . . , y¯k′) ∧
k′∧
i=1
RΩn(y¯i, z¯i)


}
~ ,
where each x¯i and y¯i is of length nℓ and each z¯i is of length nℓ
′.
Definition 6.7. For a partial natural transformation (β, k) : F 99K F ′, we define
the interpretation Th(β, k) : Th(F ′) → Th(F ) of arity k as follows. For each
compact open U ⊆ F ′n we let
Th(β, k)(RU ) = Rβ−1n (U),
and we set Th(β, k)(x = y) = Rβ−12 (Jx=yK)
.
For a morphism of partial natural transformations Θ : (β, k)→ (β′, k′) we define
the morphism of interpretations Th(Θ) : Th(β, k)→ Th(β′, k′) as RΘ1 .
Lemma 6.8. With the notation as in Definition 6.7, we have:
(i) Th(S(Γ, k)) : Th(S(T ))→ Th(S(T ′)) is defined by
R[ϕ(x¯)] 7→ R[Γ(ϕ(x¯))],
where all variables in x¯ appear in ϕ(x¯), and Th(S(Γ, k))(x = y) is R[Γ(x=y)];
(ii) JTh(β, k)(ϕ)K = β−1n (JϕK).
For a strong interpretation Γ : T → T ′, property (i) simplifies to R[ϕ] 7→ R[Γ(ϕ)].
Proof. The proof of (i) is writing out definitions, where Lemma 4.19(i) and Re-
mark 6.3 are useful. The proof of (ii) is a straightforward induction argument,
where each step is writing out definitions. 
Corollary 6.9. The operations defined in Definition 6.2 and Definition 6.7 define
a 2-functor Th : TypeSpaceFunc→ CohTheoryop, which restricts to a functor Th :
TypeSpaceFunc→ CohTheoryop.
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Proof. From Lemma 6.8 and Theorem 6.4 it follows that Th(β, k) is indeed an
interpretation. For the 2-cells we once again note that Definition 6.6 is the same as
Definition 3.4 in the internal logic of the relevant type space functors.
Let β : F → F ′ be a natural transformation satisfying the Beck-Chevalley con-
dition, and let e : 2→ 2 be given by e(2) = e(1) = 1, then:
β−12 (Jx = yK) = β−12 (F ′e(F ′2)) = Fe(β−12 (F ′2)) = Fe(F2) = Jx = yK.
So Th(β)(x = y) is RJx=yK, which by Corollary 6.5 is equivalent to x = y. 
To prove Theorem 6.4 we need to introduce the deduction-system for coherent
logic [Joh02b, Section D1.3]. For ease of reference, and to introduce notation, we
recall the rules and axioms here.
Definition 6.10. The deduction-system for coherent logic has the following rules
and axioms. Throughout, x¯ denotes the tuple (x1, . . . , xn) and ϕ, ψ and χ are
arbitrary coherent formulas.
(identity) The axiom: ϕ ⊢x¯ ϕ.
(substitution) Let f : n→m be any function, then we have the rule:
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ⊢(x1,...,xn) ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
ϕ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n)) ⊢(x1,...,xm) ψ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))
(cut) The rule:
ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ ψ ⊢x¯ χ
ϕ ⊢x¯ χ
(equality1) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the axiom: ⊤ ⊢x¯ xi = xi.
(equality2) For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the axiom: (xi = xj)∧ϕ(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn) ⊢x¯
ϕ(x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xn).
(conjunction) The axioms: ϕ ⊢x¯ ⊤, ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢x¯ ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢x¯ ψ, and the rule:
ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ ϕ ⊢x¯ χ
ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ ∧ χ
(disjunction) The axioms: ⊥ ⊢x¯ ϕ, ϕ ⊢x¯ ϕ ∨ ψ, ψ ⊢x¯ ϕ ∨ ψ, and the rule:
ϕ ⊢x¯ χ ψ ⊢x¯ χ
ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢x¯ χ
(∃-quantifier) The double rule:
ϕ(x¯, xn+1) ⊢x¯,xn+1 ψ(x¯)
∃xn+1ϕ(x¯, xn+1) ⊢x¯ ψ(x¯)
(distributivity) The axiom: ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) ⊢x¯ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ).
(Frobenius) The axiom: ϕ(x¯) ∧ ∃xn+1ψ(x¯, xn+1) ⊢x¯ ∃xn+1(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯, xn+1)).
Note that the converse of the (distributivity) and (Frobenius) rules can be de-
rived from this system [Joh02b, page 832]. We also did not mention terms in our
(substitution) rule, because our signature is purely relational.
Lemma 6.11. Let F be a type space functor, and let ϕ be an n-ary formula in
L(F ). Then for every f : n→m, we have
F−1f (Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K) = Jϕ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))K.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the formula. The non-trivial cases are
the equality symbol and existential quantification. In both cases we use that F
satisfies Beck-Chevalley, by constructing the pushout of either f and e : n → n or
f and the inclusion n→ n+ 1. 
16 MARK KAMSMA
Proposition 6.12. Let F be a type space functor, then Th(F ) is closed under
deductions in the deduction-system for coherent logic. That is, if ϕ and ψ are
L(F )-formulas, then we can deduce ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ from Th(F ) precisely when JϕK ⊆ JψK.
Proof. By definition we have that ϕ ⊢x¯ ψ is in Th(F ) if JϕK ⊆ JψK. For the
converse, we prove that Th(F ) contains all the axioms mentioned in Definition 6.10
and that it is closed under all the rules mentioned in that definition.
The rules (identity), (cut), (equality1), (conjunction), (disjunction) and (dis-
tributivity) follow directly from the definition of Th(F ). The (substitution) rule
follows from Lemma 6.11.
For (∃-quantifier) and (Frobenius) we let f : n → n+ 1 be the inclusion. Then
the former is precisely the adjunction Ff ⊣ F
−1
f , and the latter follows from the
fact that this adjunction satisfies the Frobenius condition (Proposition 5.3).
Finally, we have to check (equality2). Let e : n → n be the map that sends
i to j and is the identity everywhere else. We have Jxi = xjK = Fe(Fn) andJϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn)K = F−1e (Jϕ(x1, . . . , xi, xj , . . . , xn)K). So, we have
J(xi = xj) ∧ ϕ(x1, . . . , xi, xj , . . . , xn)K = Fe(Fn) ∩ Jϕ(x1, . . . , xi, xj , . . . , xn)K.
By the Frobenius condition (Proposition 5.3) this is equal to
Fe(Fn ∩ F
−1
e (Jϕ(x1, . . . , xi, xj , . . . , xn)K)) = Fe(Jϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn)K).
Note that Jϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn)K = F−1e (Jϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn)K), either us-
ing Lemma 6.11 or the fact that e is idempotent. So we conclude that indeed
J(xi = xj) ∧ ϕ(x1, . . . , xi, xj , . . . , xn)K =
Fe(Jϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn)K) =
Fe(F
−1
e (Jϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn)K)) ⊆
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xj , xj , . . . , xn))K.

Proof of Theorem 6.4. Combine Proposition 6.12 and Fact 2.5. 
7. The 2-equivalence
We recall the statement of the main theorem. Note that both Corollary 1.2 and
Corollary 1.3 follow directly, using Fact 4.3(ii) and Corollary 5.7 respectively.
Theorem 1.1, repeated. The 2-functors
S : CohTheoryop ⇄ TypeSpaceFunc : Th
form a strict equivalence of 2-categories, which restricts to an equivalence
S : CohTheoryop ⇄ TypeSpaceFunc : Th
Proof. We construct 2-natural isomorphisms Th(S(T )) ∼= T and S(Th(F )) ∼= F .
Since these isomorphisms will also live in CohTheory and TypeSpaceFunc re-
spectively, this proves both equivalences at the same time. Throughout this proof,
when we write ϕ(x¯) for some formula ϕ, we mean that all variables in x¯ actually
appear in ϕ.
The isomorphism Th(S(T )) ∼= T . We start by defining a strong interpretation
ΓT : Th(S(T )) → T as follows: for R[ϕ(x¯)] ∈ L(S(T )) we set ΓT (R[ϕ(x¯)]) = ϕ(x¯).
Note that by Remark 6.3 this covers all relation symbols in L(S(T )). For a formula
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ψ(x¯) in L(S(T )), we easily see by induction that [ΓT (ψ(x¯))] = Jψ(x¯)K. So by
Theorem 6.4, we have
Th(S(T )) |= ∀x¯(ψ(x¯)→ χ(x¯)) ⇐⇒
JψK ⊆ JχK ⇐⇒
[ΓT (ψ)] ⊆ [ΓT (χ)] ⇐⇒
T |= ∀x¯(ΓT (ψ)(x¯)→ ΓT (χ)(x¯)).
So ΓT is indeed a strong interpretation, and in particular an isomorphism.
Naturality in 1-cells for ΓT follows from Lemma 6.8. For (∆, k) : T → T ′:
∆(ΓT (R[ϕ(x¯)])) = ∆(ϕ(x¯)) = ΓT ′(R[∆(ϕ(x¯))]) = ΓT ′(Th(S(∆, k))(R[ϕ(x¯)])).
Naturality in 2-cells just amounts to writing down the relevant square and then
writing out the definitions.
The isomorphism S(Th(F )) ∼= F . We define βF : S(Th(F )) → F as follows.
Let n ≥ 0, and let p ∈ Sn(Th(F )). We claim that
Up = {U ∈ K
o(Fn) : RU ∈ p}
is a prime filter on Ko(Fn). Clearly ∅ 6∈ Up, because p is consistent. For U ⊆ V ,
we have by definition of Th(F ) that Th(F ) |= ∀x¯(RU (x¯)→ RV (x¯)). So if U ∈ Up,
we also have V ∈ Up. Similarly, we have that RU∩V and RU∪V are equivalent to
RU ∧RV and RU ∨RV respectively, modulo Th(F ). From which it quickly follows
that Up is a prime filter.
By the Stone duality Up corresponds to an element in Fn. With some abuse of
notation we will identify this element with Up, and we set βF,n(p) = Up.
We check that βF,n is a homeomorphism, and that it is natural n. Since
homeomorphisms are spectral maps, and natural isomorphisms always satisfy Beck-
Chevalley, we then know that βF is indeed an isomorphism in TypeSpaceFunc and
TypeSpaceFunc. To check that β is a 2-natural transformation, one only needs
write out the definitions to see that the relevant diagrams commute, which we omit.
Homeomorphism. We first prove that βF,n is continuous. Let U be a compact
open set in Fn, then
p ∈ β−1F,n(U) ⇐⇒ βF,n(p) ∈ U ⇐⇒ U ∈ Up ⇐⇒ RU ∈ p ⇐⇒ p ∈ [RU ].
So β−1F,n(U) = [RU ], and so we see that βF,n is indeed continuous.
Next we define a map g : Fn → S(Th(Fn)) that will be the inverse of βF,n. Let
q ∈ Fn, and define the set of first-order formulas:
Pq = Th(F ) ∪ {RU (x¯) : q ∈ U} ∪ {¬RV (x¯) : q 6∈ V }.
We claim that Pq is consistent. Clearly, Th(F ) is consistent, because otherwise Fn
would be empty. If Pq would be inconsistent, then by compactness there would be
U1, . . . , Uk, V1, . . . , Vm ∈ Ko(Fn), such that
Th(F ) |= ¬∃x¯(RU1(x¯) ∧ . . . ∧RUk(x¯) ∧ ¬RV1 (x¯) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬RVm(x¯)),
which is equivalent to
Th(F ) |= ∀x¯(RU1(x¯) ∧ . . . ∧RUk(x¯)→ RV1(x¯) ∨ . . . ∨RVm(x¯)).
By Theorem 6.4, this would mean that U1 ∩ . . . ∩ Uk ⊆ V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vk. However, by
construction we have q ∈ U1 ∩ . . . ∩ Uk and q 6∈ V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vk. We thus arrive at a
contradiction and conclude that Pq must be consistent. Let a¯ in some model M of
Th(F ) realise Pq, then we set g(q) = ctp
M (a¯). This is well-defined, because every
n-ary formula in L(F ) is equivalent to an n-ary relation symbol (by Corollary 6.5),
and for every n-ary relation symbol, Pq contains that symbol or its negation. In
particular, ctpM (a) is determined by {RU (x) : q ∈ U}, which is essentially the
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prime filter corresponding to q (under the Stone duality). So g is indeed the inverse
function for βF,n. We are left to check that g is continuous. For this we let [RU ]
be any compact open subset of Sn(Th(F )) (by a combination of Fact 4.3(i) and
Corollary 6.5, every compact open subset is of that form), then we have:
q ∈ g−1([RU ]) ⇐⇒ g(q) ∈ [RU ] ⇐⇒ RU ∈ g(q) ⇐⇒ q ∈ U.
So we have g−1([RU ]) = U , and we conclude that g is indeed continuous and thus
that βF,n is a homeomorphism.
Naturality in n. Let f : n → m be any function. We again abuse notation,
and identify elements in the spectral spaces with their corresponding prime filters.
Writing out definitions we obtain
Ff (βF,m(p)) = {U ∈ K
o(Fn) : RF−1
f
(U)(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ p},
βF,n(Sf (Th(F ))(p)) = {U ∈ K
o(Fn) : RU (xf(1), . . . , xf(n)) ∈ p}.
By definition JRF−1
f
(U)(x1, . . . , xm)K = JRU (xf(1), . . . , xf(n))K, so by Theorem 6.4
these are equivalent formulas and hence Ff (βF,m(p)) = βF,n(Sf (Th(F ))(p)). 
8. Classifying toposes
There is an obvious connection between CohTheory and the 2-category Topos
of (Grothendieck) toposes, via classifying toposes. In this section we will briefly
sketch this connection in terms of a pseudofunctor Set[−] : CohTheoryop → Topos.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to study this pseudofunctor any further. We
do provide a quick example (Example 8.3) why it cannot be a biequivalence, even
after restricting its codomain.
We briefly recall the definition of a classifying topos, for more information we
refer to [Joh02b, Section D3] and [Car17]. The classifying topos of T is defined to
be the topos Set[T ] such that there is a natural equivalence
T -Mod(E) ≃ Hom(E ,Set[T ]),
where T -Mod(E) is the category of models of T internal to E . It follows that there
must be a generic model GT in Set[T ], corresponding to the identity morphism,
such that for any geometric morphism f : E → Set[T ] the corresponding model is
given by f∗(GT ).
Definition 8.1. Every coherent theory T has a classifying topos Set[T ]. We extend
this to a pseudofunctor Set[−] : CohTheoryop → Topos by describing what it does
on 1-cells and 2-cells.
Let (Γ, k) : T → T ′ be an interpretation, and let M be a model of T ′ in some
topos E . Then we can carry out the construction from Remark 3.2 internally in E
to obtain a model Γ∗(M) of T in E . In particular, if we consider GT ′ in Set[T
′],
then we obtain a model Γ∗(GT ′) of T in Set[T
′]. Under the equivalence
T -Mod(Set[T ′]) ≃ Hom(Set[T ′],Set[T ]), (1)
this corresponds to a geometric morphism Set[Γ, k] : Set[T ′]→ Set[T ].
Let θ : (Γ, k)→ (Γ′, k′) be a morphism of interpretations from T to T ′. Carrying
out the construction from Remark 3.5 internally in Set[T ′] we get an internal homo-
morphism fθ : Γ
∗(GT ′)→ Γ′∗(GT ′). Under the equivalence in (1), this corresponds
to a natural transformation Set[θ] : Set[Γ, k]→ Set[Γ′, k′].
Remark 8.2. In the topos-theoretic setting an interpretation (of coherent theories)
is often defined as a coherent functor between the syntactic categories, see e.g.
[Car17, Definition 1.4.12]. This forces the equality symbol to be interpreted as the
equality symbol on some definable set. This thus weaker than our definition of
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interpretation, where it could be a definable equivalence relation in general. So the
temptation to define Set[−] via syntactic categories must be resisted.
Even if we restrict codomain of Set[−] to coherent toposes (those toposes that
classify a coherent theory), it cannot be a biequivalence. Two theories with equival-
ent classifying toposes are called Morita-equivalent. It is well-known that Morita-
equivalence is weaker than being bi-interpretable. We provide a basic counter-
example. More elaborate examples can be found in [CR14, CR15].
Example 8.3. For a distributive lattice L, let T (L) be the (propositional) theory
of that lattice. That is, we have a propositional symbol Ra for each a ∈ L, and
T (L) = {¬∃x(x = x)} ∪ {Ra → Rb : a ≤ b in L}.
Let O(R) be the lattice of open subsets of R, and let B ⊆ O(R) be a count-
able basis. Then Set[T (O(R))] and Set[T (B)] are both the category of sheaves
on R, so T (O(R)) and T (B) are Morita-equivalent. However, they can never be
bi-interpretable. To see this, let (Γ, k) : T (O(R)) ⇄ T (B) : (∆, ℓ) be any two
interpretations. Then by the pigeonhole principle, there must be different opens
U, V ⊆ R such that Γ(RU ) = Γ(RV ), hence ∆Γ(RU ) = ∆Γ(RV ). So (∆Γ, kℓ)
cannot be isomorphic to the identity interpretation, because that would mean that
RU is equivalent to ∆Γ(RU ) = ∆Γ(RV ), and hence to RV .
If we restrict to a certain class of theories, these counterexamples go away.
Definition 8.4. Call a theory T positively disjoint if there are formulas ϕ(x¯) and
ψ(x¯) such that T |= ∃x¯ϕ(x¯) ∧ ∃ψ(x¯) and T |= ∀x¯¬(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)).
From [Mce20, Proposition 5.11] we essentially get the following fact.
Fact 8.5. If T and T ′ are positively disjoint theories, then they are Morita equi-
valent if and only if they are bi-interpretable.
We make two remarks about this fact. The first is that they require that
T |= ∃xy(x 6= y) and similar for T ′, instead of being positively disjoint. The
inequality symbol is a problem for positive logic, hence the notion of positively
disjoint theories. Their proof is easily adjusted. The point is that we can encode
so-called “coproduct sorts”.
The second remark is that their notion of Morita equivalence is based on the syn-
tactic definition from [BH16] and it is for first-order theories. In [Tse15] this is called
T-Morita equivalence and they establish a connection with coherent theories and
classifying toposes. That is, they prove that for coherent theories T-Morita equi-
valence coincides with having the same classifying topos (which they call J-Morita
equivalence). They also prove that a first-order theory is T-Morita equivalent to
its Morleyisation.
Question 8.6. Aside from reflecting equivalences, what nice properties does Set[−]
have when restricted to positively disjoint theories?
References
[BH16] Thomas William Barrett and Hans Halvorson. Morita Equivalence. The Review of Sym-
bolic Logic, 9(3):556–582, September 2016. arXiv: 1506.04675.
[BY03a] Itay Ben-Yaacov. Positive model theory and compact abstract theories. Journal of Math-
ematical Logic, 03(01):85–118, May 2003.
[BY03b] Itay Ben-Yaacov. Thickness, and a categoric view of type-space functors. Fundamenta
Mathematicae, 179:199–224, 2003.
[Car17] Olivia Caramello. Theories, Sites, Toposes: Relating and studying mathematical theories
through topos-theoretic ’bridges’. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, December
2017.
20 MARK KAMSMA
[Cou12] Dion Coumans. Generalising canonical extension to the categorical setting. Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, 163(12):1940–1961, December 2012.
[CR14] Olivia Caramello and Anna Carla Russo. Lattice-ordered abelian groups and perfect MV-
algebras: a topos-theoretic perspective. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 22, September
2014.
[CR15] Olivia Caramello and Anna Carla Russo. The Morita-equivalence between MV-algebras
and lattice-ordered abelian groups with strong unit. Journal of Algebra, 422:752–787,
January 2015.
[DST19] Max Dickmann, Niels Schwartz, and Marcus Tressl. Spectral Spaces. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1 edition, March 2019.
[Hay19] Levon Haykazyan. Spaces of types in positive model theory. The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 84(2):833–848, June 2019.
[Hod93] Wilfrid Hodges. Model Theory. Cambridge University Press, March 1993.
[Joh92] Peter T. Johnstone. Stone spaces. Number 3 in Cambridge studies in advanced math-
ematics. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, reprint edition, 1992. OCLC: 256773202.
[Joh02a] Peter Johnstone. Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium, volume 1.
Oxford University Press, 2002.
[Joh02b] Peter Johnstone. Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium, volume 2.
Oxford University Press, 2002.
[JY20] Niles Johnson and Donald Yau. 2-Dimensional Categories. February 2020. arXiv:
2002.06055.
[Law06] William Lawvere. Adjointness in foundations. Reprints in Theory and Applications of
Categories, 16:1–16, October 2006.
[Mce20] Paul Anh Mceldowney. On Morita equivalence and interpretability. The Review of Sym-
bolic Logic, 13(2):388–415, June 2020. Publisher: Cambridge University Press.
[MM94] Saunders MacLane and Ieke Moerdijk. Sheaves in Geometry and Logic: A First Intro-
duction to Topos Theory. Universitext. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1994.
[PY18] Bruno Poizat and Aibat Yeshkeyev. Positive Jonsson Theories. Logica Universalis,
12(1):101–127, May 2018.
[Tse15] Dimitris Tsementzis. A Syntactic Characterization of Morita Equivalence. The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, 82, July 2015.
E-mail address, Mark Kamsma: m.kamsma@uea.ac.uk
